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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Quand un pays est un leader dans un marché d’une ressource non-renouvelable, est-ce que son 
niveau de bien-être devient plus élevé? On montre que la réponse est affirmative quand il 
s’agit d’un leadership global, mais elle peut être négative dans le cas d’un leadership par 
étapes. Par contre, le niveau de bien-être mondial sous l’équilibre de Nash est supérieur à 
celui qui est le résultat de l’équilibre global de Stackelberg. Du point de vue du bien-être 
mondial,  l’équilibre  de  Stackelberg  par  étapes  est  meilleur  que  l’équilibre  global  de 
Stackelberg. 
 





Does  a  country  strictly  gain  if  it  acts  as  a  leader  in  a  resource  market  under  bilateral 
monopoly? Using differential games, we show that the answer is "yes" when leadership can 
be exercised globally (global Stackelberg leadership), but possibly "no" when it is exercised 
only  at  each  stage  (stagewise  Stackelberg  leadership).  On  the  other  hand,  world  welfare 
under  Nash  equilibrium  is  strictly  higher  than  under  global  Stackelberg  equilibrium. 
Regardless  of  which  country  is  the  leader,  world  welfare  under  stagewise  Stackelberg 
leadership is higher than under global Stackelberg leadership. 
 
Keywords: dynamic game, exhaustible resource, Stackelberg leadership. 
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The international distribution of many exhaustible resources is very uneven.
For example, 67% of oil exports come from the OPEC countries while the
United States and Japan account for 33% and 14% shares of oil imports,
respectively.1 This suggests the possibility that those countries well endowed
with exhaustible resources might seek to take advantage of their position as
collective monopolists, and that the resource-deprived countries might seek
to exploit their position as collective monopolists. A situation of bilateral
monopoly might arise. If one country could secure Stackelberg leadership,
would it strictly gains relative to the Nash equilibrium? And would the world
as a whole be worse oﬀ? Our paper is an attempt to ﬁnd answers to these
questions.
There is a large theoretical literature on the exercise of market power
in the trading relationship between a resource-poor economy and a resource-
rich economy. Broadly, this literature consists of three groups of models. The
ﬁrst group of models is characterized by the assumption that the resource-
exporting country exercises its market power while the importing country is
passive.2 The second group of models considers the opposite scenario: the
importing country imposes a tariﬀ to shift resource rents away from passive
foreign resource owners.3The third group of models deals with the case of bi-
lateral monopoly: both the importing country and exporting country realize
they have market power and behave strategically.4 Our paper belongs to the
third group, but we probe more deeply into the issue of leadership.
A useful benchmark equilibrium concept in dynamic games is the feedback
Nash equilibrium: each player takes the other player’s feedback strategy (i.e.
decision rule) as given and chooses a decision rule to maximize its payoﬀ.
1We have used the 2008 data of the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
2See Kemp and Long (1979, Section 4) and a survey by Long (2010).
3See Newbery (1976), Kemp and Long (1980), Bergstrom (1982), Brander and Djajic
(1983), Karp (1984), Maskin and Newbery (1990), Karp and Newbery (1991, 1992).
4This group includes Karp (1984), Wirl (1995), Wirl and Docker (1995), Tahvonen
(1996), Rubio and Escriche (2001), Liski and Tahvonen (2004), Rubio (2005), and Chou
and Long (2009).
2Once a feedback Nash equilibrium has been found, it seems natural to ask
whether a player may strictly prefer to be a Stackelberg leader, and if under
such a leader-follower game the world’s welfare is higher or lower than under
the feedback Nash equilibrium. The purpose of our paper is to address
these questions and related issues in the context of a resource market under
bilateral monopoly.
In dynamic games, there are two main classes of Stackelberg leadership:
open-loop Stackelberg leadership, and decision-rule Stackelberg leadership
(also called feedback Stackelberg leadership). An open-loop Stackelberg
leader announces at the beginning of the game the entire time-path of her
actions. In contrast, a decision-rule Stackelberg leader uses a rule which
conditions her action at any time on the value of the state variable(s) at
that time. Since it has long been established that in general an open-loop
Stackelberg equilibrium is time-inconsistent, we will be concerned only with
decision-rule Stackelberg leadership.5
One of the main contributions of this paper is to distinguish two types
of decision-rule Stackelberg leader: stagewise Stackelberg leader and global
Stackelberg leader. A stagewise Stackelberg leader is a ﬁrst-mover at each
date (stage); i.e. at each date she is able to commit to an action for that
date before the other player moves. In equilibrium, a stagewise Stackelberg
leader follows a decision-rule which can be obtained by solving the game
backward, beginning with the last date. In contrast, a global Stackelberg
leader is committed to a decision rule from the start of the game. To ensure
time-consistency, the set of decision rules from which a choice can be made
is restricted in such a way that the same decision rule will be chosen by the
leader at any feasible (state, date) pair.
To focus on the distinction between these two types of decision-rule Stack-
elberg leader, we use a simple model of resource extraction for which stage-
wise Stackelberg leadership has been explored. Various versions of the model
5See Dockner et al. (2000) for a discussion of the general time-inconsistency of open-
loop Stackelberg equilibrium, as well as some exceptions. Karp (1984) suggested additional
restrictions on the open-loop Stackelberg leader in order to avoid time-inconsistency.
3has been studied by Rubio and Escriche (2001), Liski and Tahvonen (2004),
Rubio (2005), and Chou and Long (2009).6 Rubio and Escriche (2001) and
Rubio (2005) restricted their consideration of Stackelberg leadership to the
stagewise variety only. They found that if the resource-exporting country is
a stagewise Stackelberg leader (i.e. if at each date it can set the producer
price before the importing country chooses its tariﬀ rate) the outcome will be
identical to the feedback Nash equilibrium. In contrast, we ﬁnd that if global
Stackelberg leadership can be exercised by the resource-exporting country,
its payoﬀ will be strictly higher than under the feedback Nash equilibrium.
In the case where the resource-importing country is the leader, we ﬁnd that
its payoﬀ as a global leader is strictly higher than its payoﬀ as a stagewise
leader (which in turn is strictly higher than its Nash equilibrium payoﬀ).
We are not aware of any paper that compares payoﬀs under global Stackel-
berg leadership with payoﬀs under stagewise Stackelberg leadership, though
each of these two leadership concepts has been used in diﬀerent contexts.
For example, Tahvonen (1996), Rubio and Escriche (2001), Benchekroun and
Long (2002), and Rubio (2005) restricted attention to stagewise Stackelberg
leadership.7 An instance of global Stackelberg leadership is Benchekroun and
Long (1998) which is reproduced in Dockner et al. (2000, chapter 5) as an
example of a time-consistent Markovian Stackelberg equilibrium.8
2 The Model
There are two countries, a resource-importing country (Home) and a resource-
exporting country (Foreign). Foreign does not consume the resource good.
Home imposes a speciﬁc tariﬀ on its imports. Foreign has a stock of resource
X. The surface area of the mine is unity, so the depth at which the last
6Liski and Tahvonen (2004) and Chou and Long (2009) considered only the feedback
Nash equilibrium.
7These authors did not use the expression “stagewise”, which made its appearance in
Basar et al. (1985) and Mehlmann (1988).
8 For some further considerations of Stackelberg leadership, see Shimomura and Xie
(2008) and Long and Sorger (2009).
4unit of resource can be found is X. The marginal cost of extraction increases
with the depth of the mine. Let S be the depth reached and q be the rate
of extraction, which is the same as the rate at which the depth increases as
extraction proceeds: ˙ S = q.9 At any time, the cost of extracting q is cSq,
i.e., the marginal cost of extraction is cS. Thus, the deeper one has to go
down, the higher is the marginal cost.
Home’s inverse demand function of the resource good is
p
c = a − q , a>c , (1)
where pc is the price the consumers have to pay per unit. The parameter a
is the ‘choke price.’ It is the marginal utility of consuming the ﬁrst unit. Let
S denote the depth at which the marginal extraction cost equals the choke
price, i.e., cS = a. We assume that X is larger than S. Then, eﬃciency
implies that the resource stock be abandoned at S = a/c, i.e., before physical
exhaustion of the stock.
Let τ be a speciﬁc tariﬀ rate levied on imported resources. Then, the
consumer price is the sum of the producer price p and the tariﬀ rate:
p
c = p + τ. (2)
From (1) and (2), the quantity demanded can be expressed as a function of
p and τ as q = a − p − τ, from which the resource dynamics is described by
˙ S = a − p − τ. (3)
Chou and Long (2009) solve for a feedback (Markov perfect) Nash equi-
librium of a game between Home and Foreign. They assume that Foreign,
taking as given Home’s feedback tariﬀ rule τ = τ(S), chooses a feedback








−rt(p − cS)[a − p − τ(S)]dt. (4)
9In what follows, we suppress the time argument t unless confusion arises.
5Taking Foreign’s feedback producer price rule p = p(S) as given, Home
chooses a feedback tariﬀ rule τ = τ(S) to maximize the discounted stream








−rt[a − p(S)+τ][a − p(S) − τ]
2
dt. (5)
Assuming that both players simultaneously move, Chou and Long (2009)
show that the feedback Nash equilibrium has the following properties:










and (iii) the depth S(t) approaches S as t →∞ .
The feedback Nash equilibrium has an appealing property: as long as
marginal cost cS is below the choke price a, extraction should proceed. And
extraction should never be at a depth where marginal cost cS exceeds the
choke price a.
The main purpose of our paper is to ﬁnd feedback Stackelberg equilibria
of this game, where the leader is committed to a feedback rule. We consider
both the case in which Home leads and the case in which Foreign leads. We
begin with the former case, where Home announces in advance to Foreign
that it is committed to a feedback tariﬀ rule τ(S). Clearly, the leader can
commit to the Nash equilibrium tariﬀ rule found in Chou and Long (2009),
and thus achieve exactly the same outcome in terms of price, quantity, and
welfare as in the Nash equilibrium. An interesting question is whether the
leader will be able to do strictly better. The next section is devoted to this
question.
63 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with Im-
porter’s Leadership
To ﬁnd a Stackelberg equilibrium in which Home is a leader, we suppose
that it announces right at the beginning of the game a linear feedback tariﬀ
rule τ(S)=αS + β. Since the game is solved backward, let us consider the
follower’s problem. Foreign’s Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is
rV
∗(S) = max
p {(p − cS)(a − p − αS − β)+V
∗
S(S)(a − p − αS − β)},
where V ∗(S) is Foreign’s value function and V ∗
S(S) ≡ dV ∗(S)/dS. The ﬁrst-
order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields Foreign’s strategy:
p(S)=
V ∗
S(S)+( −α + c)S + a − β
2
.
Given the linear-quadratic structure of the game, it is plausible to guess that













where A∗,B∗ and C∗ are undetermined coeﬃcients which are endogenously
derived below. Equation (6) immediately leads to V ∗
S(S)=A∗S + B∗ and
the above strategy is rewritten as
p =
(−A∗ − α + c)S − B∗ + a − β
2
. (7)















Equating the coeﬃcients of S2 and S, and of constant term on the left-hand


















7Solving the ﬁrst equation for A∗ yields
A
∗ = α + c + r ±
√
Δ
Δ ≡ r(2α +2 c + r) > 0.
Substituting (7) into the resource dynamics yields p =
(−A∗−α+c)S−B∗+a−β
2
˙ S = a − αS − β −
(−A∗ − α + c)S − B∗ + a − β
2
=
(A∗ − α − c)
2
S +
B∗ + a − β
2
.
Therefore, in order to guarantee asymptotic stability, we need to require
(A∗ − α − c) < 0. As a result, A∗ is determined as
A
∗ = α + c + r −
√
Δ. (8)















































Having described the follower’s behavior, let us turn to the leader’s prob-
lem. To this end, substituting (11) into (3), the resource dynamics under
linear strategies is
˙ S = −(α + α
∗)S + a − β − β
∗,









a − β − β∗
α + α∗ .
8The instantaneous welfare of Home under linear strategies τ(S)=αS+β








2 − 2[αβ + α








Substituting the above solution of S, and α∗ and β∗ into this and rearranging
terms, we obtain
2W =































Taking the integral of this function, Home’s payoﬀ from any (state, date)





































At time t = 0 Home chooses α and β to maximize (12) with (S ,t  )=( S0,0).
Therefore, α and β are obtained by solving the ﬁrst-order conditions by
diﬀerentiating the right-hand side of (12) -evaluated at (S ,t  )=( S0,0)-
with respect to α and β. However, such solutions for α and β would depend
on S0. This implies that if Home is allowed to reoptimize at any time t1 > 0,
the optimal value of α and β becomes a function of S(t1) which is diﬀerent
from S0. Accordingly, α and β determined at time 0 are no longer optimal
at time t1, i.e., they are time-inconsistent.
To ensure time-consistency, we impose the restriction that αa + βc =0 .
The economic meaning of this restriction is that when S  = S, Home’s payoﬀ
is zero, as the term inside the square brackets [...] in equation (12) is then
zero.10
10We thank Hassan Benchekroun for this observation.
9Under this restriction, the above maximization problem amounts to
max
α























= 2(2α +2 c + r)
3
2.
While it does not seem possible to obtain an explicit solution of α in this
equation, we can prove the existence of the solution. Since we want Δ ≡






































































Noting that f(−∞)=−∞ and f(∞)=∞, we conclude that f(λ)=0a t
three values, λ =0 ,λ1 < 0, and λ2 > 0, and that there exists a unique posi-






. This implies that there exists a
unique value of α which maximizes Home’s objective function. Finally, β is
derived as β = −αa/c. This result is summarized as follows.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in
linear strategies where Home (the importing country) is a leader. As S ap-
proaches S, the tariﬀ rate τ approaches zero, and the price approaches the
choke price a.
104 Feedback Stackelberg Equilibrium with Ex-
porter’s Leadership
This section turns to the case in which Foreign is a leader. Supposing that






−rt(a − α∗S − β∗ + τ)(a − α∗S − β∗ − τ)
2
dt
s.t. ˙ S = a − α
∗S − β
∗ − τ.









where V (S) is Home’s value function and VS(S) is its derivative with respect
to S. The ﬁrst-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side yields
τ(S)=−VS(S)=−AS − B, (13)
by assuming V (S)=AS2/2+BS + C. Substituting this into the HJB





2 + BS + C
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By applying the procedure developed in the last section, the three parameters
are
A =































∗ + r) > 0.
11Substituting these into (13), the follower’s strategy is
τ(S)=












Since the dynamics of S is
˙ S = a − α
∗S − β
∗ + AS + B,
























Let us now consider the exporting ﬁrm’s problem. The instantaneous
proﬁt is
π =( p − cS)(a − p − τ)=( α
∗S + β
∗ − cS)(a − α
∗S − β
∗ + AS + B).























































[aα∗ − c(a − β∗)]
 













As was in the last section, let us make the time consistency condition:

















12The ﬁrst-order condition is
(2α
∗ +2 c + r)[r(4α
∗ + r)]
1
2 =( 4 α
∗ + r)
2,
which does not yield a close-form expression for α∗. Fortunately we can prove
the unique existence of solution by a transformation of variables.














2 +( 4 c + r)




We must ﬁnd γ>0 that satisﬁes this condition. Deﬁning
g(γ)=4 γ
3 − rγ
2 − 2r(4c + r)γ,
the rest of our task to ﬁnd a positive γ which satisﬁes g(γ∗)=r(r +4 c)2.
Since g( 0 )=0 ,g (0) < 0, limγ→∞ g(γ)=∞ and limγ→−∞ g(γ)=−∞,
we ﬁnd three solutions to g(γ)=0 :γ =0 ,γ 1 < 0 and γ2 > 0. Therefore, we
have arrived at:
Proposition 2. There exists a unique feedback Stackelberg equilibrium in
linear strategies where Foreign (the exporting country) is a leader. As S
approaches S, the tariﬀ rate τ approaches zero, and the price approaches the
choke price a.
5 Feedback Nash Equilibrium
Having derived two Stackelberg equilibria, we brieﬂy consider the Nash equi-
librium.11 Chou and Long (2009) show that the feedback Nash equilibrium
















11For the details in this section, see Chou and Long (2009).
13i.e., V ∗(S)=2 V (S) and V ∗





[a − cS +3 VS(S)]
2 .




















where μ = 2
3
 
(r2 +3 cr)1/2 − r
 
.
Since V (a/c) = 0, the boundary condition is satisﬁed. Starting at time

































































Thus, we can establish:
Proposition 3. There exists a unique feedback Nash equilibrium in linear
strategies. As S approaches S, the tariﬀ rate τ approaches zero, and the
price approaches the choke price a.
146 Welfare Implications
6.1 Comparing with Nash equilibrium
We now have three feedback solutions and the corresponding levels of welfare
of each country and the world. Our ﬁnding is summarized in Tables 1, 3 and
5.12 These tables provide us with several interesting observations.
First, the world welfare which is the sum of the two countries’ welfare
is largest in the Nash equilibrium and lowest in the Stackelberg equilibrium
where the importing country is a leader. This result relies crucially on the
assumption that the exporting country uses a price decision rule. Might it be
reversed once the exporting country’s strategy on price (a price decision rule)
is replaced by a quantity decision rule? In a companion paper, assuming that
the exporting ﬁrm uses a quantity decision rule, Fujiwara and Long (2009)
show that the Nash equilibrium indeed yields the smallest world welfare
compared to either Stackelberg equilibrium; in particular the Stackelberg
equilibrium with the importer’s leadership yields the largest world welfare.13
The second point, which is related to the ﬁrst one, is that under price
strategies the Stackelberg equilibria are not Pareto superior to the Nash equi-
librium. In other words, both players’ welfare can not improve simultaneously
by moving from the Nash equilibrium to either Stackelberg equilibrium. This
is again reversed in the quantity setting model of Fujiwara and Long (2009),
where in any one of the two Stackelberg equilibria, both players’ payoﬀs are
higher than in the Nash equilibrium. That is, when the exporting coun-
try determines the output, there is no conﬂict of interest between countries
concerning the movement from Nash to Stackelberg.
6.2 Comparing with stagewise Stackelberg leadership
The feedback Stackelberg equilibria we have derived can be called a global (or
hierarchical) feedback Stackelberg equilibria since the leader determines its
12Detailed calculations are available from the authors upon request.
13This contrast is analogous to the sharp contrast between the implications of the
Brander-Spencer model and those of the Eaton-Grossman model of strategic trade policies.
15strategy over the entire horizon, prior to the strategy choice of the follower.
On the other hand, a diﬀerent concept of feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
has been used in literature, which has been called a stagewise feedback Stack-
elberg equilibrium (see Basar and Olsder, 1995, and Mehlmann,1988).
A player is said to be a stagewise Stackelberg leader if at each point of time
t she takes her action, say uL(t), before the other player (the follower) chooses
his action, say uF(t). The follower’s action at time t is a “reaction” to the
leader’s action uL(t). If time is discrete and the game is a ﬁnite-horizon game,
backward solution yields the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium. If time is
continuous and/or the time horizon is inﬁnite, an argument relying on taking
limits shows that a dynamic-programming based method also applies.14
In a framework similar to ours, Rubio and Escriche (2001) characterize
the stagewise feedback Stackelberg equilibria and conclude that, when the
exporting country leads, the Stackelberg equilibrium is identical to the Nash
equilibrium.15 This coincidence between a stagewise Stackelberg outcome
and the Nash outcome may be explained by depicting a reaction curve di-
agram of a static version of our model. From (4) and (5), the ﬁrst-order






= a − 2p − τ =0 .
Figure 1 depicts the reaction curve diagram, from which it is obvious that
the intersection of the two reaction curves gives the Stackelberg equilibrium
where Foreign (exporting country) is a leader as well as the Nash equilibrium.
Thus, the above ﬁnding of Rubio and Escriche (2001) can be regarded as
a dynamic extension of this static result: under stagewise leadership of the
exporting country, the importing country’s optimal tariﬀ rate at time t is not
14Levhari and Mirman (1980) solved for both the Nash equilibrium and the stagewise
Stackelberg equilibrium of a ﬁsh-war model in discrete time. Basar et al. (1985) solved for
the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium of a model of capitalist-worker conﬂict in discrete
time and argued that the method can extended to the continuous time setting.
15They also ﬁnd that this is not the case when the importing country leads.
16dependent on the price p(t) and thus the exporting country gains nothing
from being a stagewise leader16.
(Figure 1)
This subsection shows how stagewise leadership leads to numerical values
that are totally diﬀerent from global leadership.
Assuming quadratic value functions, V (S)=AS2/2+BS + C and
V ∗(S)=A∗S2/2+B∗S + C∗, the stagewise feedback Stackelberg equilib-
rium with Home’s leadership is obtained as follows.17
A =













































Ψ=r(9r +2 0 c) > 0.
Tables 1 and 2 permit comparison of outcomes in terms of welfare under
the global Stackelberg solution concept and the stagewise Stackelberg solu-
tion concept, respectively, using the same parameter values.18 These tables
show that the diﬀerence between the two solution concepts is striking. In
particular, it is worth mentioning that the leader’s welfare increment relative
to the Nash equilibrium is larger in the global Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e.
with its precommitment to a time-consistent Markovian decision rule) than
in the stagewise Stackelberg equilibrium (where such a precommitment is
ruled out). Similarly, the follower loses more in the global solution than in
16In contrast, if it is the global leader, it is committed to a pricing strategy p = α∗S +β
and clearly τ would depend on these parameters.
17Derivations are found in Appendix A in Rubio and Escriche (2001).
18Tables 3-6 show that exactly the same conclusion holds under other parameter values.
17the stagewise solution. This is because the leader can take better advantage
of its leadership position in the global solution by precommitting. However,
we must note that the leader gains at the expense of the follower’s large wel-
fare losses, thereby leading to a decline in the world welfare in Stackelberg
equilibria relative to the Nash equilibria. This world welfare losses are larger
in the global solution than in the stagewise solution for the above reason. In
other words, whether the leader can precommit has signiﬁcant implications
from a practical point of view as well as theoretically.
7 Concluding Remarks
We have considered some welfare implications of a dynamic game model of
international trade involving exhaustible resource extraction. This paper
possibly has contributed to both international economics and dynamic game
theory. While we have characterized three feedback solutions in a dynamic
trade model with a linear-quadratic structure where both countries exercise
market power, our technique of deriving the global Stackelberg solutions
through using a time-consistency condition is applicable to a wide variety of
dynamic games.
However, our attempt is preliminary, leaving much unexplored. In par-
ticular, we have exclusively focused on the linear feedback solutions. As is
recently documented by Shimomura and Xie (2008), dynamic Stackelberg
games can admit nonlinear strategies which may lead to a superior outcome
than linear strategies.19 We plan to tackle non-linear strategies in our future
research.
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21Home Foreign Total
Nash 0.128831946a2 0.257663892a2 0.386495838a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.275a2 0.05a2 0.325a2
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.042548195a2 0.307126431a2 0.349674626a2
Table 1: Example 1 (global solution): payoﬀs under S0 =0 ,r =0 .05 and
c =1
Home Foreign Total
Nash & Foreign is leader 0.128831946a2 0.257663892a2 0.386495838a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.222493132a2 0.148328754a2 0.370821886a2
Table 2: Example 1 (stagewise solution): payoﬀs under S0 =0 ,r=0 .05 and
c =1
22Home Foreign Total
Nash 0.4a2 0.8a2 1.2a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.750340468a2 0.211085264a2 0.961425732a2
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.187621814a2 0.889234071a2 1.07685589a2
Table 3: Example 2 (global solution): payoﬀs under S0 =0 ,r =0 .05 and
c =0 .25
Home Foreign Total
Nash & Foreign is leader 0.4a2 0.8a2 1.2a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.664297931a2 0.442865287a2 1.10716322a2
Table 4: Example 2 (stagewise solution): payoﬀs under S0 =0 ,r=0 .05 and
c =0 .25
Home Foreign Total
Nash & Foreign is leader 0.115913729a2 0.231827458a2 0.347741187a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.232629432a2 0.052793837a2 0.285423269a2
Stackelberg (Foreign is leader) 0.045787993a2 0.266915675a2 0.312703668a2
Table 5: Example 3 (global solution): payoﬀs under S0 =0 ,r =0 .1 and
c =1
Home Foreign Total
Nash 0.115913729a2 0.231827458a2 0.347741187a2
Stackelberg (Home is leader) 0.196888509a2 0.131259006a2 0.328147515a2









Figure 1: Reaction curves in the static model
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